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NOTE 
The Constitutionality of Caps: Upholding 
Missouri’s Right to Jury Trial and the Non-
Economic Damages Debate 
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc) 
RACHEL LAWRENCE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a loved one who, through no fault of their own, suffers from the 
terrible consequences of a medical professional’s negligence.  Picture a fam-
ily member who is left paralyzed, unable to ever independently walk or move 
below the waist again, who will spend most of his or her remaining years 
sitting in a bed or chair.  Imagine the pain and suffering, emotional anguish, 
physical impairment, and loss of capacity to enjoy life that this person will 
face on a daily basis.  Now imagine that for the rest of this person’s life, the 
most he or she will be able to recover in non-monetary damages from the 
negligent medical professional is $350,000, no matter how negligent the care 
or severe the mental anguish.1  Until a Supreme Court of Missouri decision in 
July 2012,2 this was not an imaginary situation, but a very real problem fac-
ing hundreds3 of Missouri patients and families. 
Tort reform is an issue within the health care industry that has seen at-
tention both at the state and national level.4  One aspect of tort reform in-
  
 * B.J., University of Missouri, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2014; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.  Special 
thanks to my advisor Professor Peters for his guidance and great knowledge of health 
care law.  Thank you to my parents for their endless support throughout law school 
and to my editors and fellow members of the Missouri Law Review who made this 
Note possible. 
 1. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (Supp. 2011), held unconstitutional by Watts 
v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 2. Watts, 376 S.W.3d  at 648. 
 3. See 2011 Missouri Medical Malpractice Insurance Report, MO. DEP’T OF 
INS., FIN. INSTS. & PROF’L REGISTRATION vii (2012), http://insurance.mo.gov 
/reports/medmal/documents/2011MissouriMedicalMalpracticeReport.pdf. 
 4. See David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006), available 
at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsa054479.  “In 2005, President George 
W. Bush proposed a nationwide $250,000 cap” on non-economic damages, but it was 
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volves capping damages in medical malpractice claims.5  Missouri has 
capped damages since 1986 through Missouri Revised Statutes chapter 538, 
“Tort Actions Based on Improper Health Care.”6  Within its various sections, 
chapter 538 includes limits on non-economic damages,7 how and when dam-
ages are paid,8 the requirement of affidavits by health care professionals con-
firming merits of the lawsuit,9 immunity from civil liability for certain health 
care professionals,10 and venue for certain actions against health care provid-
ers.11  Under Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.210, a $350,000 non-
economic damage cap was in place in 2012 when Watts v. Lester E. Cox 
Medical Centers was decided.12  
After a 4-3 decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri that declared the 
$350,000 statutory cap unconstitutional, supporters of tort reform predicted 
“dire consequences” for the future of the health care system.13  Nationwide, 
supporters of non-economic caps claimed a medical malpractice “crisis” had 
unfolded, resulting in doctors moving their practices to states with lower mal-
practice insurance rates, turning away high-risk patients and engaging in “de-
fensive medicine” to avoid potential malpractice lawsuits.14  Physicians and 
other health care representatives blamed excessive, frivolous lawsuits and 
  
never finalized.  See Damian Stutz, Non-Economic-Damage Award Caps in Wiscon-
sin: Why Ferdon Was (Almost) Right and the Law is Wrong, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 105, 
107, 123 (2009). 
 5. See Lee Harris, Tort Reform as Carrot-and-Stick, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 163, 
166 (2009).  Medical malpractice damages are categorized into three types: economic, 
non-economic and punitive.  Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of 
Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 398 (2005).  Economic 
or pecuniary damages include medical costs, lost wages and rehabilitation expenses.  
Id.  Non-economic damages are “damages arising from non-pecuniary harm including 
. . . pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigure-
ment, loss of capacity to enjoy life, and loss of consortium,” and do not include puni-
tive damages.  MO. REV. STAT. § 538.205(7).    
 6. See JEFFREY HERMAN, MISSOURI TORT REFORM AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
5 (2012), http://www.covermissouri.org/docs/MOTortReformv2.pdf. 
 7. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 538.210, 538.215. 
 8. Id. § 538.220. 
 9. Id. § 538.225. 
 10. Id. § 538.228. 
 11. Id. § 538.232. 
 12. Id. § 538.210, held unconstitutional by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 
376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 13. See Missouri Court Overturns 2005 Cap on Liability Lawsuits, THE 
EXAMINER, July 31, 2012, http://washingtonexaminer.com/mo.-court-overturns-2005-
cap-on-liability-lawsuits/article/feed/2018257.  
 14. Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medi-
cal Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 478 (2012). 
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high plaintiff payouts for the rise in malpractice premiums.15  In contrast, 
those who opposed the statutory cap celebrated the Watts decision, claiming 
Missourians had their “constitutional rights restored.”16  Nationally, plain-
tiffs’ lawyers and patient advocates claimed states “unconstitutionally re-
strict[ed] access to the courts” and limited redress of injury when legislators 
capped damages.17  Because caps limited recovery at a certain amount regard-
less of extent or type of injury, plaintiff advocacy groups alleged patients 
were “squeezed out of a system designed to give them full redress” for the 
harm they suffered.18 
This split in opinion raises important questions.  Should caps on non-
economic damages be constitutional in Missouri?  Just how much do non-
economic caps affect medical malpractice insurance premiums and the health 
care system overall?  Are caps a fair solution to rising costs of health care or 
just a quick fix solution to a much more damaged system?  This Note will 
discuss these questions and others involving the constitutionality of caps on 
non-economic damages and the policy issues that surround this controversial 
topic. 
This Note argues that the Watts decision appropriately invalidated the 
statutory limits on economic damages, finding non-economic caps on dam-
ages unconstitutional.  Part II of this Note analyzes the facts and holding of 
Watts.  Part III examines previous constitutional challenges to Missouri Re-
vised Statutes chapter 538 and how the court interpreted constitutional lan-
guage to reach its decision.  Next, Part IV explains the court’s rationale in 
Watts.  Last, Part V explains why the court was correct in declaring non-
economic damage caps unconstitutional and explores the policy issues behind 
statutory limitations on damages. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On October 30, 2006, Deborah Watts (Watts) visited “a clinic associated 
with” the Cox Medical Center (Cox) after experiencing cramping and “de-
creased fetal movement” in the 39th week of her pregnancy.19  A third year 
medical resident, Dr. Herrman, examined Watts, but failed to perform further 
  
 15. Alec Shelby Bayer, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving into the Roots 
of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 111, 116 
(2005). 
 16. Alicia Gallegos, Medical Liability: Court Strikes Down Noneconomic Dam-
ages Cap, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews 
/2012/08/13/gvsa0813.htm. 
 17. Williams, supra note 14, at 479. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
3
Lawrence: Lawrence: Constitutionality of Caps
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: LawrencePaginated.docx Created on:  10/31/13 7:46 PM Last Printed: 2/1/14 12:05 PM 
604 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
diagnostic monitoring and applicable tests related to the decreased fetal 
movement.20  Dr. Herrman’s supervisor signed off on the examination.21 
Two days later, “Watts was admitted to the hospital due to lack of fetal 
movement[]” and “was placed on a fetal monitor at 9:10 a.m.”22  According 
to Watts’ expert Dr. Roberts, the monitor indicated “fetal hypoxia” and “aci-
dosis” by which the standard of care demands immediate delivery by caesar-
ean section.23  However, Dr. Green, a second year resident who was examin-
ing Watts, did not start the caesarean section until one hour and thirty-five 
minutes later, at 10:45 am.24  As a result, Watt’s son Naython was born with 
“catastrophic brain injuries.”25 
Watts filed a medical malpractice claim against Cox on behalf of her 
son, asserting that Naython was born with disabling brain injuries caused by 
the hospital and its associated physicians’ negligent care.26  The jury found in 
favor of Watts, awarding $3.371 million in future medical damages and $1.45 
million in non-economic damages.27  As required by Missouri Revised Stat-
utes section 538.210, the trial court reduced Watts’ non-economic damages to 
$350,000.28  Watts appealed from the Circuit Court of Greene County, claim-
ing section 538.210 violated multiple provisions of the Missouri Constitu-
tion.29 
After reviewing the case de novo, the Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.210 was unconstitutional.30  The 
court reasoned that the non-economic cap interfered with the jury’s role of 
determining an injured party’s damages and thus “violate[d] the right to trial 
by jury guaranteed by article 1, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.”31  
The court reversed the judgment of capped damages pursuant to section 
538.210, overruling Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital,32 which held non-
economic caps constitutional.33 
  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 635. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 636-37. 
 31. Id. at 636; see MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a) (“That the right of trial by jury as 
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate[]”).  
 32. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 646; Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 
898, 900 (Mo. 1992) (en banc), overruled by Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633. 
 33. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 900. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will first discuss the history of Missouri Revised Statutes 
chapter 538, specifically section 538.210 before and after its revision in 2005.  
Next, this Part will examine chapter 538’s history of constitutional challenges 
in Missouri.  This Part will then explain and analyze phrasing within the Mis-
souri Constitution that guarantees Missouri’s right to trial by jury.  Next, this 
Part will look at the Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation of legislative 
reasoning behind statutory caps and the rising costs of health care.  Lastly, 
this Part will compare different state approaches to non-economic caps by 
examining why different state courts have upheld or overturned caps based on 
their respective state constitutions. 
A.  The History of Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 538  
In 1975, California became the first state to cap non-economic damages 
at $250,000, a ceiling that remains in effect today.34  Although in 1975 
$250,000 was about the equivalent of one million dollars in today’s money, 
the cap has not been adjusted for inflation.35  Other states such as Maryland36 
and Colorado37 followed in 1986.  Currently, more than half of all states have 
a type of cap in place that limits a plaintiff’s non-economic damages.38   
Missouri first began to cap damages in medical malpractice claims in 
1986 based on concerns about increasing malpractice premium costs and the 
high number of medical malpractice lawsuits.39  The 1986 legislation limited 
a plaintiff’s recovery to $350,000, an amount that was adjusted yearly by the 
Missouri Department of Insurance to reflect inflation.40  By 2005, the limit 
  
 34. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), § 24.6, 1975 Cal. Stat. 
3949, 3969 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.)). 
 35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI 
inflation calculator, $250,000 in 1975 was worth $1,066,886.62 in 2012.  CPI Infla-
tion Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=250%2C000&year1=1975&year2 
=2012 (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).   
 36. Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 639, § 11-108, 1986 Md. Laws 2347 (codified as 
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Sess.)). 
 37. Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 107, § 1, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 677 (codified 
as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Sess.)). 
 38. See AM. MED. ASS’N, CAPS ON DAMAGES (2011), http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/arc/capsdamages.pdf; infra note 183. 
 39. HERMAN, supra note 6, at 5. 
 40. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (1986) (amended 2005), held unconstitutional by 
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); see Medi-
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had reached $579,000.41  In addition, a plaintiff could recover multiple caps 
from one injury when there was more than one defendant.42  Because of the 
increased monetary damages and the republican legislature’s push for addi-
tional tort reform,43 the Missouri legislature modified the statutory provision 
with several changes in 2005.44  The new statute took effect August 28, 2005, 
and returned the non-economic damage cap to $350,000 without an escalator 
clause for inflation.45  Until the Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers deci-
sion in July 2012,46 some kind of limitation on non-economic damages ex-
isted in Missouri for the past 26 years. 
1.  The Original Section 538.210  
In 1986, the Missouri legislature enacted chapter 538 in an effort to re-
form medical malpractice tort claims.47  Included in chapter 538 was section 
538.210, the limitation on non-economic damages.48  The section stated: 
In any action against a health care provider for damages for per-
sonal injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to 
render health care services, no plaintiff shall recover more than 
  
cal Malpractice Limits, MO. DEP’T OF INS., http://insurance.mo.gov/industry 
/medmal.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).  Each year, the amount of damages 
awarded increased.  Id.  For example, with inflation, the amount in 2004 was 
$565,000 and in 2005 had reached $579,000.  Id. 
 41. Medical Malpractice Limits, supra note 40. 
 42. Scott v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, 70 S.W.3d 560, 571 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2002) (defining “per occurrence” as an act by a defendant, not injury to the plaintiff).  
This decision was one of the main reasons the statutory language was revisited in 
2005.  See Mo. Med Mal Data Show Court’s Cap Ruling Needs Reversal: Commish, 
INS. J. (May 14, 2003), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2003/05/14 
/28933.htm. 
 43. Stephanie K. Jones, Missouri Supreme Court Strikes Down Non-Economic 
Damage Cap, INS. J. (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest 
/2012/08/02/257980.htm. 
 44. HERMAN, supra note 6, at 5.  Section 538.210 was amended in 2005 by 
House Bill 393, H.B. 393, 2005 93d. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005).  2005 
Mo. Laws 651; see Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Mo. 
2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (involving a claim under the amended section 538.210). 
 45. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (Supp. 2011), held unconstitutional by Watts v. 
Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 46. Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633. 
 47. Paul J. Passanante & Dawn M. Mefford, Anticipated Constitutional Chal-
lenges to Tort Reform, 62 J. MO. B. 206, 206 (2006). 
 48. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (1986) (amended 2005), held unconstitutional by 
Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633. 
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[$350,000] per occurrence for noneconomic damages from any one 
defendant[.]49  
Additionally, in Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.210.3, the statute 
provided that when the trier of fact was a jury, the court shall not instruct the 
jury about the non-economic damage award limitation.50  In section 
538.210.4, the statute stated that the limits on non-economic damage awards 
were to be increased or decreased on January 1st each year in accordance 
with inflation.51  Section 538.210.5 provided that punitive damages shall be 
awarded only after the plaintiff showed the health care provider exhibited 
“willful, wanton or malicious conduct” related to the action that caused the 
injury.52 
In 2001, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, helped clarify 
the language in section 538.210 when the court examined what a “plaintiff” 
meant under the statute.53  In Wright v. Barr, Wright, a patient who suffered 
atrial fibrillation, was discharged from the hospital after her doctor made no 
attempt to detect blood clots in her heart.54  A “transesophageal echocardio-
gram” later detected a clot in her left atrium.55  As a result from the clot going 
undetected, she suffered from two debilitating strokes in one week and was 
left in need of 24-hour care.56  Wright sued for negligence and her husband 
claimed loss of consortium.57  The jury returned a verdict for the Wrights, 
awarding Mrs. Wright $320,000 for non-economic damages and Mr. Wright 
$300,000, totaling $620,000.58  The defendant doctor and hospital appealed 
and filed a motion to reduce the amount of non-economic damages from 
$620,000 to $528,000 pursuant to section 538.210 and the inflation clause in 
place.59  The defendants argued that because Mr. Wright’s consortium claim 
was derivative of Mrs. Wright’s claim, the husband and wife should be con-
sidered one plaintiff in accordance with the statute.60   
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, denied the motion to 
reduce damages and reasoned that because Mr. and Mrs. Wright were sepa-
  
 49. Id. § 538.210.1. 
 50. Id. § 538.210.3. 
 51. Id. § 538.210.4.  Awards were increased or decreased in accordance with the 
Implicit Price Deflator for Personal Consumption Expenditures, published by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce.  Id. 
 52. Id. § 538.210.5. 
 53. Wright v. Barr, 62 S.W.3d 509, 536 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). 
 54. Id. at 516-19. 
 55. Id. at 519. 
 56. Id. at 519, 523. 
 57. Id. at 515. 
 58. Id. at 523. 
 59. Id. at 535. 
 60. Id. 
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rate plaintiffs, the statutory cap applied separately to the two claims.61  Ac-
cording to the court, based on the statutory language of section 538.210 in 
2001, caps applied per plaintiff, and both received separate awards.62   
In 2002, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, interpreted the 
meaning of “per occurrence” within section 538.210 in Scott v. SSM 
Healthcare St. Louis.63  In Scott, Scott and his mother brought an action for 
medical malpractice after doctors misdiagnosed a sinus infection in Scott’s 
brain as a minor concussion.64  Left untreated, the infection caused Scott’s 
brain to swell and required skull reconstructive surgery.65  Scott sustained 
serious injuries including paralysis on the right side of his body and a perma-
nent drainage tube in his brain.66  The Scotts alleged that two doctors acted 
below the standard of care: Dr. Koch in misreading Scott’s initial CT scan 
and Dr. Doumit for failing to advise Scott to return to the hospital after his 
initial symptoms did not improve.67 
The jury ruled for the Scotts and found both Dr. Koch and Dr. Doumit at 
fault.68  The City of St. Louis Circuit Court determined that in the Scotts’ 
case, two caps could be applied pursuant to section 538.210 because two 
separate occurrences of malpractice took place.69  Thus, the Scotts were able 
to recover $1,056,000 in non-economic damages, or twice the amount of the 
$528,000 cap in place that year.70  SSM Healthcare appealed and alleged that 
the court erred in applying more than one statutory damage cap.71  
In reaching a decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, 
looked at the language within section 538.210 and interpreted the meaning of 
“occurrence” as used in the statute.72  While SSM Healthcare argued that 
“occurrence” referred to overall death or injury a plaintiff sustained, the 
Scotts argued “occurrence” meant an act of negligence by a medical profes-
  
 61. Id. at 538. 
 62. Id.  However, in Missouri wrongful death cases, separate family members 
were often treated as one plaintiff under section 538.210 before 2005.  See Cook v. 
Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (en banc) (holding that the 
surviving spouse and two children of a woman who died as a result of malpractice 
were to be treated as one plaintiff for the purposes of section 538.210); Burns v. Elk 
River Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 485-87 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) (holding that 
one statutory cap should be applied even though the decedent’s mother and father 
were both entitled to recover for the wrongful death). 
 63. 70 S.W.3d 560, 570-71 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002). 
 64. Id. at 563. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 564. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 562. 
 72. Id. at 570. 
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sional.73  The court reasoned that if the legislature wanted only one cap to 
apply, regardless of how many individual occurrences of malpractice, the 
“clearest and most unambiguous way” would have been to leave “per occur-
rence” out of the statute completely.74  Looking at this legislative intent, the 
court held that two caps could be applied when “two separate and distinct 
‘occurrences’ of medical malpractice” led to a plaintiff’s injuries, and af-
firmed the lower court’s decision.75  Three years later, however, the legisla-
ture redefined the statute so that only one damage cap could apply in cases 
with multiple defendants.76 
2.  The Amended Section 538.210  
Several changes and additions were made to the Missouri Revised Stat-
utes section 538.210 in 2005.  In 2005, the legislature changed the wording 
from “no plaintiff shall recover more than [$350,000] for noneconomic dam-
ages . . . from any one defendant’” to “irrespective of the number of defen-
dants.”77  This change allowed only one damage award per plaintiff, no mat-
ter how many defendants were responsible.78  The same year, the legislature 
also removed the inflation clause and restored the maximum non-economic 
damage award to $350,000, as was originally set in 1986.79  Replacing the 
inflation clause, section 538.210.4 stated “any spouse claiming damages for 
loss of consortium of [his or her] spouse shall be considered to be the same 
plaintiff as [his or her] spouse[,]” thus eliminating a spouse’s individual non-
economic damages and collectively capping damages for the couple at 
$350,000.80  Section 538.210.6 was also added in 2005, and stated all indi-
viduals asserting a wrongful death claim for the same decedent would be 
considered one plaintiff, since only one action can be brought under section 
537.080 against any one defendant for the death of one person.81  No addi-
tional changes were made to the statute from 2005 to 2012, the year Watts 
was decided.82 
Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center was the first case to reach the Su-
preme Court of Missouri that challenged the 2005 amended version of section 
  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 571. 
 75. Id. at 571, 573.   
 76. 2005 Mo. Laws 651-21 (“no plaintiff shall recover more than three hundred 
fifty thousand dollars for noneconomic damages irrespective of the number of defen-
dants”) (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.1 (Supp. 2011), held unconstitutional 
by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (Supp. 2011). 
9
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538.210.83  The court again clarified section 538.210, this time in terms of 
when the new cap could be applied to older occurrences of malpractice.84  In 
Klotz, a jury previously found St. Anthony’s Medical Center negligent for 
implanting an infected pacemaker in Klotz that resulted in “sepsis, amputa-
tion, and organ failure.”85  The jury returned verdicts in favor of the Klotzes 
for Mr. Klotz’s medical malpractice claim and for Mrs. Klotz’s loss of con-
sortium claim.86  The Klotzes appealed after the trial court reduced Mr. 
Klotz’s non-economic damages and eliminated Mrs. Klotz’s loss of consor-
tium damages pursuant to section 538.210.4.87  
The malpractice incident occurred when the previous version of section 
538.210 was controlling law;88 under the pre-amended version with inflation, 
the Klotzes would have each been permitted damages up to $579,000.89  
However, the new version of section 538.210 reduced the cap to $350,000 for 
all suits filed after August 28, 2005.90  The Klotzes did not file suit until De-
cember 2006.91  The Klotzes argued that applying the new cap of $350,000 to 
a cause of action that occurred before the effective date of the new law “vio-
late[d] the prohibition of retrospective laws.”92  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri agreed with the Klotzes and held that the new $350,000 economic dam-
age cap under section 538.210 could not be applied to causes of action before 
August 28, 2005.93 
Although Klotz left the issue of constitutionality for a later decision, in 
his concurring opinion, Judge Richard B. Teitelman criticized section 
538.210, claiming the cap harmed the most severely injured, especially young 
and economically disadvantaged people, while those with minor injuries re-
ceived full recovery.94  In his concurring opinion, Judge Michael A. Wolff 
also expressed his belief that caps on non-economic damages violated the 
constitutional right to trial by jury guaranteed in article 1, section 22(a) of the 
Missouri Constitution.95  Calling the constitutional controversy surrounding 
section 538.210 an “issue that the court one day will have to confront,” 
  
 83. 311 S.W.3d 752, 772 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (Wolff, J., concurring) (per cu-
riam). 
 84. Id. at 759-60 (majority opinion). 
 85. Id. at 758. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 772 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 758 (majority opinion). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 782 (Teitelman, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 773 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
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Wolff’s concurring opinion foreshadowed the majority decision reached two 
years later in Watts.96  
B.  Missouri’s Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury 
The right to trial by jury has existed in Missouri since the United States 
attained jurisdiction over the Louisiana Territory in 1803, predating Missouri 
statehood.97  The first right to jury trial provision was enacted in 1804 and 
afforded jury trials in civil cases “if either party requested it.”98  Later, territo-
rial laws provided jury trials “in ‘all civil cases of the value of one hundred 
dollars . . . if either of the parties require[d] it.’”99  In 1820, Missouri’s state 
constitution was written and included that the right to a jury trial shall “re-
main inviolate.”100  In 1875, the phrase “as heretofore enjoyed” was added, 
“to keep the year 1820 as the point of reference.”101  
In Watts, the Supreme Court of Missouri looked at the definition of “in-
violate,” which meant “free from change or blemish, pure or unbroken.”102  
The court interpreted this phrase to mean if any change is applied to the 
common law right to a jury trial, “the right to trial by jury does not ‘remain 
inviolate’ and . . . is [thus] unconstitutional.”103  The court also read the lan-
guage “heretofore enjoyed” to mean that current day Missouri citizens had 
the right to a jury trial if a plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on the same 
issue in 1820.104  
Despite the language in the Missouri Constitution that guarantees a right 
to a jury trial, Missouri has a history of case decisions, including State ex rel. 
  
 96. Id.; see also Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc) (holding section 538.210 unconstitutional as a violation of the right to trial 
by jury).  Wolff did not participate in the Watts decision because he retired from the 
court in August 2011.  See Judge Michael A. Wolff, Supreme Court of Missouri, 
YOUR MO. COURTS, http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=153 (last visited Feb. 
14, 2013). 
 97. State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 98. Id. (citing Mo. Terr. Laws 4, 5 (1804)). 
 99. Id. (citing Mo. Terr. Laws 58, § 13). 
 100. Id. (quoting MO. CONST. art. XIII, § 8 (1820), available at 
http://digital.library.umsystem.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=mocon;cc 
=mocon;sid=e100841c261ee37206da7238b649faee;rgn=full%20text;idno=moco
n000027;view=image;seq=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2013)). 
 101. Id. at 84-85; see also MO. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1875), available at 
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=0gEbAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&o
utput=reader&authuser=0&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA7.  The full phrase is now “. . . hereto-
fore enjoyed shall remain inviolate[.]”  MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a). 
 102. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1993)).   
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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Tolbert v. Sweeney and Adams v. Mercy Children’s Hospital that suggest the 
right to trial by jury could be changed or altered by legislative action.105  In 
Tolbert, decided in 1992, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, 
held that there was no right to a jury trial in damages cases for employment 
discrimination because the legislature did not provide for a jury trial.106  After 
Tolbert, there were no jury trials in employment discrimination cases for 
damages in Missouri for eleven years.107  Similarly, in Adams v. Mercy Chil-
dren’s Hospital, decided the same year as Tolbert, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that the legislature had the right to “abrogate a cause of action cog-
nizable under common law completely.”108  The court reasoned that if the 
legislature has the power to generate and eliminate causes of action, the legis-
lature could also limit the recovery.109    
Over a decade later in State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that the right to a jury trial was “beyond the reach of 
hostile legislation.”110  Diehl overturned Tolbert, but did not criticize or even 
mention the Adams decision.111  However, in his concurring opinion in Klotz, 
Judge Wolff called the court’s previous reasoning in Adams “flawed.”112  
Wolff said the Adams decision incorrectly implied that statutory law could 
overcome the constitutional right to a jury trial.113  Under the Missouri Con-
stitution, the power to change the right to a jury trial can only be altered by 
the citizens of Missouri when put to a vote.114  
Adams heavily relied on a 1931 Missouri case, De May v. Liberty Foun-
dry Company.115  In De May, Emma De May filed a claim for worker’s com-
pensation after her husband Albert strained himself and developed a hernia 
while working for the Liberty Foundry Company.116  Albert later died from a 
  
 105. See State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Mo. App. S.D. 
1992), overruled by State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. 1992) (en banc), 
overruled by Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633.  Under the provisions of the constitution, the 
power to change the right to a jury trial can only be altered by the citizens of Missouri 
when put to a vote.  MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b). 
 106. Tolbert, 828 S.W.2d at 932. 
 107. Tolbert, which was decided in 1992, was overturned in 2003 by Diehl, 95 
S.W.3d at 92. 
 108. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 92 (quoting Lee v. Conran, 111 S.W. 1151, 1153 (Mo. 
1908)). 
 111. See id. 
 112. Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 773 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) 
(Wolff, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
 113. Id. at 774. 
 114. MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b). 
 115. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. 
 116. De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Mo. 1931). 
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hernia operation.117  The employer denied that Albert suffered an injury at 
work or that his death resulted from his employment with the company.118  
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission found for the employer and De 
May received no compensation.119  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri,120 De May alleged that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was uncon-
stitutional and violated the right to trial by jury.121  The court held that the 
legislature had the power to grant and take away remedies and that the Act 
was not in violation of any constitutional provisions.122  Essentially, Adams 
relied on this case to show that if the legislature could take away causes of 
action, the legislature also had the power to limit recovery.123 
Adams also cited to a Supreme Court of the United States case, Tull v. 
United States, to support that the right to jury trial did not extend to the jury’s 
determination of damages.124  In Tull, the Court held that under the Seventh 
Amendment there is a right for a jury to determine liability, but there is not a 
constitutional right for a jury to determine a civil penalty.125  According to 
Tull, the only issues placed beyond the power of the legislature are “the most 
fundamental elements” of a trial by jury, not a civil penalty.126 
The Adams court also relied on a Virginia case, Etheridge v. Medical 
Center Hospitals.127  In Etheridge, Richie Lee Wilson sustained permanent 
brain damage and paralysis on her left side due to medical negligence after 
undergoing jawbone surgery.128  The jury returned a verdict of $2,750,000, 
but the trial court reduced the verdict to $750,000 under Virginia’s recovery 
cap section 8.01-581.15.129  Wilson appealed, alleging the statutory cap vio-
lated her right to a jury trial under the Virginia Constitution.130  The court 
held that the cap did not violate Wilson’s constitutional right because the cap 
was applied after the jury completed its fact-finding task.131  Adams used the 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 643. 
 121. Id. at 645. 
 122. Id. at 652-53, 656. 
 123. See Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. 1992) (en 
banc), overruled by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987). 
 126. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. 
 128. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 526-27 (Va. 1989). 
 129. Id. at 527. 
 130. Id. at 527-28. 
 131. Id. at 529. 
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court’s reasoning in Etheridge to reach a similar outcome under Missouri’s 
constitutional right to trial by jury.132  
C.  Constitutional Challenges of Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 
538 
Several provisions of section 538.210 have been challenged in the courts 
on constitutional grounds.133  This section will look at cases that applied sec-
tion 538.210 before the Missouri legislature modified the provision and after 
the changes were made in 2005.  
In 1992, Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital set the precedent for up-
holding damage caps and remained good law in Missouri for twenty years.134  
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld section 538.210, reducing a 
young girl’s recovery from the jury’s award of $13 million to comply with 
the 1986 version of the damages cap.135  The lawsuit arose after an eight-
year-old girl was administered three times the normal fluid amount of crystal-
loid solution during skin graft surgery.136  In recovery, aware of the amount 
of crystalloid Adams received, defendant Dr. Mestad removed Adams’ en-
dotracheal tube.137  The large amount of fluid administered caused her body 
to swell and her trachea to close.138  No oxygen reached her brain for six 
minutes, which left her blind, epileptic, and permanently brain damaged.139   
Adams argued limiting non-economic damages under section 538.210 
violated several provisions of the Missouri Constitution, including right to 
trial by jury.140  The court denied all of Adams’ constitutional challenges.141  
The court reasoned that the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Missouri 
Constitution was not violated because section 538.210 was “applied after the 
  
 132. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. 
 133. Passanante & Mefford, supra note 47, at 206.  I think this sentence should be 
deleted. Please see comment above.  
 134. See 832 S.W.2d at 900. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Adams listed nine Missouri constitutional provisions that had been violated: 
“(1) the open courts provision, MO. CONST. art. I, § 14; (2) right to trial by jury, MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 22(a); (3) equal rights and opportunities, MO. CONST. art. I, § 2; (4) 
due process, MO. CONST. art. I, § 10; (5) special law, MO. CONST. art. III, § 40(28); 
(6) privileges and immunities, MO. CONST. art. I, § 13; (7) one subject requirement, 
MO. CONST. art. III, § 23; (8) separation of powers, MO. CONST. art. III, § 1; and (9) 
the constitutional directives for amending statutes, MO. CONST. art. III, § 28.”  Id. at 
901. 
 141. Id. at 908. 
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jury completed its constitutional task” of assessing damages.142  The court 
also noted that the legislature enacted the provisions “related to the general 
goal of preserving adequate, affordable health care for all Missourians.”143 
Although caps were still in place following Adams, award amounts grew 
larger each year as inflation increased.144  As courts awarded large sums to 
plaintiffs in a variety of actions,145 the legislature amended section 538.210 in 
2005 limiting cap amounts and multiple plaintiff awards.146  However, even 
after 2005 many cases continued to apply the pre-amended version of the 
statute when the instances of malpractice occurred before 2005.147  The only 
two cases to reach the Supreme Court of Missouri that challenged the new 
section 538.210 were Klotz and Watts.148 
In 2012, in Sanders v. Ahmed, the pre-amended section 538.210 was 
challenged in a wrongful death action.149  In Sanders, Dr. Ahmed changed 
Mrs. Sander’s medications, causing a focal seizure resulting in physical and 
mental deterioration and her death two years later.150  Her husband filed a 
wrongful death lawsuit against the defendant doctor and his practice.151  The 
jury returned a verdict of $9.2 million in non-economic damages, but the trial 
court reduced the damages to $1,265,207.64, pursuant to the pre-amended 
  
 142. Id. at 907. 
 143. Id. at 904-05.  Adams was affirmed later that year by the court in Vincent v. 
Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (holding that limiting a dam-
age award was constitutional after a doctor negligently failed to perform a timely 
caesarian section, which led to permanent brain damage of a newborn).  It is interest-
ing to note the factual similarities between Vincent and Watts in light of the two very 
different outcomes.  
 144. Medical Malpractice Limits, supra note 41. 
 145. See, e.g., LaRose v. Washington Univ., 154 S.W.3d 365, 368-69, 373 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2004) (holding that a $690,908.56 damage award for failing to order an 
ultrasound that would have detected patient’s ovarian cancer and a $71,250 loss of 
consortium award for patient’s husband was not excessive under section 538.210); 
Schroeder v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., Inc., 833 S.W.2d 411, 412, 423 (Mo. App. S.D. 
1992) (holding that a plaintiff in a wrongful death action could recover $400,000 in 
punitive damages under section 538.210.5 after cardiologic solution that had been 
negligently compounded was used in patient’s surgery, resulting in her death). 
 146. 2005 Mo. Laws. 651 (codified at MO. STAT. REV. § 538.210 (Supp. 2011), 
held unconstitutional by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc)). 
 147. See, e.g., Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam); Coleman v. Meritt, 292 S.W.3d 339, 344-45 (Mo. App. S.D. 
2009) (holding that a patient could recover two damage caps totaling $1,200,000 
when two doctors were at fault since caps applied per occurrence under the then-
applicable section 538.210). 
 148. See Klotz, 311 S.W.3d 752; Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633. 
 149. 364 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 150. Id. at 201. 
 151. Id. 
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section 538.210.152  Mr. Sanders challenged the damages cap, alleging that 
the statute was unconstitutional because it violated article I, section 22(a) of 
the Missouri Constitution, the right to trial by jury, and article II, section I, 
the separation of powers.153   
In the majority decision written by Judge William Ray Price Jr., the Su-
preme Court of Missouri found that Missouri did not recognize wrongful 
death when the Missouri Constitution was written; instead, wrongful death 
was a cause of action created by section 537.080.1.154  The court concluded 
that because the legislature created the cause of action, it had the power to 
define the amount of damages available or negate any cause of action that did 
not exist before 1820.155  Thus, the court found that section 538.210 limiting 
non-economic damages in wrongful death suits did not violate the Missouri 
Constitution.156  
Judge George W. Draper III dissented, arguing that the non-economic 
statutory cap violated the “inviolate” right to trial by jury provided by the 
Missouri Constitution.157  He reasoned that after the right to a jury trial at-
tached, it is “beyond the reach of hostile legislation.”158  The court came to a 
similar conclusion in Watts, just over three months later, when Chief Justice 
Richard B. Teitelman wrote the majority decision holding non-economic caps 
unconstitutional in Missouri.159  
D.  Protecting Missouri’s Health Care System 
Missouri’s high court also has a history of recognizing and upholding 
legislation it believed protected Missouri doctors from high premiums and 
high numbers of lawsuits.160  In two noteworthy cases, the court discussed the 
issue of protecting health care providers and the role chapter 538 played in 
the health care system.  
  
 152. Id. at 200.  Because the incident of negligence took place before the amended 
section 538.210 took effect in 2005, the damages were adjusted for inflation in 2010 
at $632,603.82 per each defendant, totaling $1,265,207.64.  Id. at 202. 
 153. Id. at 202-05. 
 154. Id. at 200, 203. 
 155. Id. at 205. 
 156. Id. at 201. 
 157. Id. at 214 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 251 (quoting State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 92 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 159. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 635-36 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc).  Because most of the same judges who decided Sanders also ruled on Watts, it 
is interesting to note a change in opinion by Judge Stith just three months later. This 
sentence could be deleted too 
 160. See Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Mo. 
1991) (en banc); Budding v. SSM Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo. 2000) 
(en banc). 
16
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In Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, Linda and Richard Mahoney 
brought a medical malpractice action against Doerhoff Surgical Services.161  
After ninety days, Doerhoff moved to dismiss the Mahoneys’ action for fail-
ure to adhere with Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.225.162  This statute 
states that within ninety days of filing a petition against a health care provider 
for damages, the plaintiff must file an affidavit with the written opinion of a 
qualified health professional stating that the defendant “failed to use such 
care” that a reasonable health care provider would “under similar circum-
stances” and that the failure caused or contributed to the damages claim.163  
The Mahoneys’ action was dismissed and they appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Missouri claiming section 538.225 violated their constitutional right 
to a jury trial.164  The Mahoneys argued that the statute “unduly burden[ed]” 
their rights by creating a “screening process” where merits of the case were 
determined “by [a] health care professional” before being submitted to a 
jury.165 
The court held that the statute did not violate article 1, section 22(a) of 
the Missouri Constitution, the constitutional right to a trial by jury,166 and 
affirmed the dismissal of the Mahoneys’ medical malpractice claim.167 The 
court reasoned from the history and text of chapter 538 that section 538.225 
was a “legislative response to the public concern over the increased cost of 
health care.”168  The purpose behind the statute, according to the court, was to 
protect the court system from “ungrounded medical malpractice claims” that 
lacked merit.169  As a result, the court took the “continued integrity of the 
health care system” into consideration during its assessment of constitutional 
challenges.170  
Additionally, in Budding v. SSM Healthcare Systems in 2000, the court 
looked to the legislature’s intent in creating Missouri Revised Statutes chapter 
538 and upheld specific limitations on tort actions against health care profes-
sionals.171  In Budding, Denise Budding filed a strict product liability claim 
against SSM Healthcare System for personal injuries she sustained after re-
ceiving defective joint implants.172  The jury returned a verdict for SSM 
Healthcare System, Budding appealed, and the case was later transferred to 
  
 161. Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 505. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 538.225(1) (1986)). 
 164. Id. at 505-06. 
 165. Id. at 507. 
 166. Id. at 509. 
 167. Id. at 513. 
 168. Id. at 507. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 19 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). 
 172. Id. at 679. 
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the Supreme Court of Missouri.173  In its decision, the court discussed “the 
legislature’s intent in adopting the [several] provisions of [Missouri Revised 
Statutes] chapter 538.”174  The court concluded that the legislature’s intent 
was to “impose specific limitations” on traditional tort actions made against a 
health care provider, specifically strict products liability in this case.175  These 
limitations also included caps on non-economic damages,176 structured set-
tlements of future damages,177 and the requirement that a cause of action be 
dependent on an affidavit submitted by a legally qualified health care pro-
vider.178  Although the court recognized some public policy arguments for 
imposing strict liability against health care providers, ultimately the court 
deferred to the legislature’s decision on public policy and affirmed the trial 
court judgment.179  
While Mahoney showed the court believed the legislature’s intent be-
hind capping non-economic damages was to limit the increasing costs of 
health care,180 Budding demonstrated the court’s belief that legislative intent 
was to impose limitations on plaintiffs, such as non-economic caps on dam-
ages, when actions were brought against health care providers.181 
E.  Non-Economic Damage Cap Statutes and Constitutional Differ-
ences Between States 
States that impose a non-economic cap vary extensively in the amount a 
plaintiff can receive and the type of damage the cap covers.182  Currently, 
twenty-nine states have enacted statutes that impose some kind of non-
economic cap.183  These include states with newly enacted non-economic 
  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 680. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.1 (1994). 
 177. Id. § 538.220.2. 
 178. Id. § 538.225.1. 
 179. Budding, 19 S.W.3d at 682. 
 180. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. 1991) 
(en banc). 
 181. Budding, 19 S.W.3d at 680. 
 182. AM. MED. ASS’N, CAPS ON DAMAGES, supra note 38. 
 183. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.010 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. 
Sess. and 3d Special Sess. of the 27th Legis.); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West, West-
law through 2012 Reg. Sess. Laws); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 2 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 69th Gen. Assembly); FLA. STAT. 
§ 766.118 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West, Westlaw through end of 2012 2nd Reg. 
Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West, 
Westlaw through the 2012 Reg. Sess.), unconstitutional as applied by Oliver v. Mag-
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caps that went into effect in 2011, including North Carolina,184 Tennessee, 185 
and Oklahoma,186 as well as caps that were upheld by state supreme courts in 
2012 after constitutional challenges in Kansas187 and Texas.188  
1.  States That Have Overturned Non-Economic Caps 
Courts have overturned caps in Missouri in 2012,189 Georgia190 and Illi-
nois191 in 2010, and Alabama,192 New Hampshire,193 and Washington194 in 
  
nolia Clinic, 71 So. 3d 1170 (La. Ct. App. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 
(2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West, Westlaw through Ch. 464 
of the 2012 2nd Annual Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (West, Westlaw through 
end of 2012 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (West, Westlaw through all 
2011 laws); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2825 (West, Westlaw through the 102nd 
Legis. 2nd Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.035 (West, Westlaw through the 
2011 76th Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (West, Westlaw through the 2nd 
Reg. Sess. of the 50th Legis.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West, Westlaw 
through end of the 2012 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-42-02 (West, West-
law through the 2011 Reg. & Special Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West, 
Westlaw through all 2011 laws); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 61.2 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 370 of the 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 53d Legis.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
31.710 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2012 Reg. Sess.), held unconstitutional by 
Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 
(West, Westlaw through end of 2012 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West, 
Westlaw through end of 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
74.301 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
4th Spec. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (West, Westlaw through end of the 
2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West, Westlaw 
through end of the 2012 1st Extraordinary Sess.).  Additionally, Virginia currently has 
a $2 million dollar cap on total damages for recovery.  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 
(West, Westlaw through end of 2012 Reg. Sess. & end of 2012 Spec. Sess. I).   
 184. An Act to Reform the Laws Relating to Money Judgment Appeal Bonds, 
Bifurcation of Trials in Civil Cases, and Medical Liability, § 7, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 
1712.  
 185. Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, ch. 510, § 10, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 
H.B. 2008. 
 186. Alicia Gallegos, Oklahoma Enacts Caps on Noneconomic Damages, AM. 
MED. NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.amednews.com/article/20110425/government/304259957/7/. 
 187. Tony Rizzo, Kansas High Court Upholds Cap on Malpractice Damages, 
KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 5, 2012, http://www.kansascity.com/2012/10/05/3849007 
/kansas-high-court-upholds-malpractice.html. 
 188. Alicia Gallegos, Appeals Court Upholds Often-Cited Medical Liability Dam-
age Cap, AM. MED. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2012/09/24/prsb0924.htm.  
 189. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
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previous years.  Cap legislation is not permissible in Arizona,195 Arkansas,196 
Kentucky,197 Pennsylvania,198 or Wyoming199 because caps on non-economic 
damages are specifically prohibited in their respective state constitutions.  
Constitutional language has also been used in states like Alabama and Mis-
souri to overturn non-economic caps.200  
In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association, the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama held that the phrasing “shall remain inviolate” “‘freezes’ the right to 
trial by jury as that right existed in 1901,” the ratification date of Alabama’s 
Constitution.201  Since juries in Alabama determined damages for pain and 
suffering in 1901, imposing a $400,000 limitation for non-economic damages 
burdened the right to trial by jury and was found unconstitutional.202   
  
 190. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 
2010) (holding Georgia Code section 51-12-1, which limited non-economic recovery 
to $350,000, as unconstitutional because it was “violative of the right to trial by 
jury”).  
 191. LeBron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (holding 
Illinois’ limitation on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions in Illinois 
Compiled Statutes section 2-1706.5 in violation of the separation of powers clause in 
the Illinois Constitution). 
 192. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 170-71 (Ala. 1991) (hold-
ing that Alabama Code section 6-5-544(b) was unconstitutional because the malprac-
tice non-economic cap violated the right to trial by jury and the equal protection guar-
antee under the Alabama Constitution). 
 193. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1233 (N.H. 1991) (holding New 
Hampshire’s statute section 508:4-d capping recovery for non-economic loss as un-
constitutional because it violated the equal protection provisions of the state constitu-
tion).  
 194. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723, 728 (Wash. 1989) (holding 
that Washington Revised Code section 4.56.250, which set limits on the amount of 
noneconomic damages that could be recovered, violated article I, section 12, of the 
state constitution (the constitutional right to trial by jury)). 
 195. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 31 (“[n]o law shall be enacted in this state limiting the 
amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person”). 
 196. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 32 (“no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be 
recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons”). 
 197. KY. CONST. § 54 (“The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the 
amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or 
property.”). 
 198. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18 (“in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit 
the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons”). 
 199. WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4 (“No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of 
damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991); 
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638-39 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 201. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 159 (quoting Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 So. 2d 651, 652 
(Ala. 1974)). 
 202. Id. at 159, 164. 
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2.  States That Have Upheld Non-Economic Caps 
Other states, such as Idaho and Nebraska, with the same “remain invio-
late” language in their state constitutions,203 have interpreted the language 
differently.204  In Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Centers, the Supreme 
Court of Idaho held that the non-economic cap did not violate the right to a 
jury as it existed at the adoption of the Idaho Constitution, reasoning that the 
jury was still allowed to “act as the fact finder” and the non-economic cap 
“simply limit[ed] the legal consequences of the jury’s findings.”205  Similarly, 
in Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health System, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court held that the trial court applied the non-economic cap “only after the 
jury has fulfilled its factfinding function,” and thus the cap did not violate 
Nebraska’s right to a jury trial.206 
3.  Recent Constitutional Challenges to Non-Economic Damage Caps 
Currently Florida207 and Tennessee208 face ongoing constitutional chal-
lenges for non-economic damage caps in court.  Indiana209 and Mississippi210 
also recently handed down decisions in 2013 regarding non-economic dam-
age caps. 
A question about the constitutionality of Florida’s non-economic dam-
age cap currently is before the Supreme Court of Florida after being reviewed 
by the Eleventh Circuit.211  In Estate of McCall v. United States, Michelle 
McCall’s parents and father of her son sued under the federal Tort Claims Act 
claiming that Michelle’s death was due to medical malpractice shortly after 
she gave birth on an air force base.212  The district court awarded her estate 
$2,000,000 in non-economic damages, but limited recovery to $1,000,000 
  
 203. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7 (“[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”); 
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”). 
 204. Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1117-20 (Idaho 2000); 
Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 75 (Neb. 
2003). 
 205. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1120. 
 206. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 75. 
 207. Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2011) (re-
manding challenges to the noneconomic damage cap under state constitutional law to 
the Florida Supreme Court). 
 208. See Complaint, Gummo v. Ward, No. 2:12-cv-00060 (M.D. Tenn. July 2, 
2012), 2012 WL 2566916. 
 209. Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. Of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. 2013). 
 210. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 211. McCall, 642 F.3d at 946. 
 212. Id. at 946-47. 
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under Florida’s statutory cap section 766.118.213  McCall’s estate appealed, 
and argued the cap violated the United States and Florida Constitutions.214  
The Eleventh Circuit found that the “[d]istrict [c]ourt did not err in ap-
plying the cap” and that it did not violate the United States Constitution or the 
Takings Clause of the Florida Constitution.215  But because there were no 
controlling Florida Supreme Court decisions to guide the judges, the Eleventh 
Circuit asked the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the cap vio-
lated the Florida Constitution.216  The Supreme Court of Florida heard oral 
arguments in February of 2012 but has not yet released an opinion.217 
In Tennessee, in February 2012, Maykayla Gummo sustained “cata-
strophic injuries” from a four-wheeler accident after she drove off an em-
bankment and fell eighty feet into a creek.218  In July 2012, her mother An-
drea Gummo sued Robert and Shelaena Ward, the owners of the four-
wheeler, in federal court in the Middle District of Tennessee.219  Gummo 
challenged the constitutionality of Tennessee’s $750,000 non-economic cap, 
claiming it violated the right to trial by jury in the Tennessee Constitution.220  
Because Tennessee’s Constitution is similar to Missouri’s in that it provides 
that “the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate[,] . . . ”221 Gummo relied 
part on the recent Missouri decision in Watts.222  On September 30, 2013, 
District Judge Kevin H. Sharp filed a memorandum opinion of the court, de-
nying plaintiffs' request for the court to declare the caps on non-economic 
damages unconstitutional because the request was “not ripe for considera-
tion” and would not be ripe until plaintiffs obtained “a verdict in excess of 
one or more of those caps.”223 
  
 213. Id. at 947. 
 214. Id. at 948.  Plaintiffs argued the statutory cap “constitute[d] a taking in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment” and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Id. 
 215. Id. at 946; The Takings Clause of the Florida Constitution states “[n]o pri-
vate property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation 
therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and 
available to the owner.”  FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a). 
 216. Id. 
 217. The Supreme Court of Florida heard oral arguments on Estate of Michelle 
Evette McCall v. United States on February 9, 2012.  Oral Argument Schedule & 
Briefs, FLA. SUPREME COURT, http://www.floridasupremecourt.org 
/pub_info/summaries/oa02-12.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 218. David L. Hudson Jr., More States See Tort Limits Challenged as Unconstitu-
tional, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://ht.ly/jRfnr. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 222. See Complaint, Gummo v. Ward, No. 2:12-cv-00060 (M.D. Tenn. July 2, 
2012), 2012 WL 2566916, at *9. 
 223. Gummo v. Ward, 2013 WL 5446074, at *1-2 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).   
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In a wrongful death case in Indiana, the plaintiff alleged medical mal-
practice when doctors failed to diagnose his wife’s bowel obstruction, result-
ing in her death.224  A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him 
$8.5 million in damages, but the award was later reduced to $1.25 million 
under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.225  The plaintiff sought an evi-
dentiary hearing to challenge the constitutionality of the cap but the trial court 
denied the request.226  The plaintiff appealed and the case was transferred to 
the Supreme Court of Indiana.227  In January 2013, the court affirmed the 
trial’s courts decision, reasoning that the plaintiff “forfeited his opportunity to 
conduct such a hearing” when he failed to raise the claim before the verdict 
and waited eight days to object to the reduction of the award.228  
In Mississippi, Lisa Learmonth filed suit against Sears after she was in a 
serious automobile accident with a Sears employee driving a Sears vehicle.229  
The jury awarded Learmonth $2,218,905.60 in non-economic damages, 
which was later reduced to $1 million under Mississippi’s damages cap, Mis-
sissippi Code section 11-1-60(2)(b).230  Sears appealed to the Fifth Circuit 
and Learmonth cross-appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the dam-
ages cap under the Mississippi Constitution.231  Because no controlling 
precedent was found, the Fifth Circuit certified the question of Mississippi’s 
cap and its constitutionality to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.232  In 
August 2012, the Supreme Court of Mississippi declined to answer the ques-
tion.233  The Fifth Circuit reexamined the issue in October 2012 and in Febru-
ary 2013 upheld the constitutionality of the cap, holding that Learmonth 
failed to establish that the cap violated the jury guarantee or separation of 
power provisions under the Mississippi Constitution.234 
IV.   THE INSTANT DECISION 
In Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.210 violated the right to 
a trial by jury found in article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.235  
  
 224. Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 956 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2011), vacated, 981 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. 2013). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. Of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 50 (Ind. 2013). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 55. 
 229. Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. Learmonth, 95 So. 3d 633, 634 (Miss. 2012). 
 230. Id. at 634-35. 
 231. Id. at 635. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 639. 
 234. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 235. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
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In so holding, the court reversed its previous decision, Adams v. Children’s 
Mercy Hospital, which allowed non-economic damages to be capped under 
the statute.236 
A.  Right to Trial by Jury “Heretofore Enjoyed” 
At trial, Watts argued that the circuit court erred in reducing the “non-
economic damages award[] . . . because section 538.210 violate[d] the right to 
trial by jury guaranteed by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitu-
tion.”237  Watts argued it was a plaintiff’s “substantive right” to have damages 
determined by a jury.238  Because the jury awarded Watts damages in excess 
of the damages cap, the award could not have its “full and intended effect.”239  
Watts stated that the right to trial by jury as “heretofore enjoyed” included the 
right of a jury to determine non-economic damages because of what was 
originally allowed in the Missouri Constitution.240  
In response, Cox argued that the jury completed its constitutional task 
after it resolved disputed facts.241  Thus, Cox reasoned, the jury’s role was 
completed at the time section 538.210 was applied as a matter of law, and did 
not violate the Missouri Constitution.242  Cox also argued that the General 
Assembly had the “power to create, modify, limit, or abrogate causes of ac-
tion or remedies” without violating the right to trial by jury.243  Cox inter-
preted the “heretofore enjoyed” phrase in the Missouri Constitution as giving 
the General Assembly legislative power over the common law, actions and 
remedies, as was the case when the Missouri Constitution was first written in 
1820.244 
The court sided with Watts, holding that the right to a jury trial “hereto-
fore enjoyed” as stated in the Missouri Constitution was not subject to caps 
on damages because such limits did not exist when the constitution was 
adopted in 1820.245  The court looked to the state of the common law in 1820 
and the history of judicial remittitur to support its conclusion.246 
The court first established Watts’ right to a jury trial on her medical neg-
ligence claim for non-economic damages by looking to the origin of Mis-
  
 236. Id. 
 237. Initial Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633 (No. SC91867), 
2011 MO S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 204, at *9. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at *26, *29-34. 
 241. Initial Brief for Respondent-Appellee, Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633 (No. 
SC91867), 2012 MO S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 9, at *26. 
 242. Id. at *28. 
 243. Id. at *15-16. 
 244. Id. at *22-23. 
 245. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 639. 
 246. Id. 
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souri’s common law: English common law.247  English common law ac-
knowledged medical negligence as a “private wrong,” deserving of redress in 
court and permitted recovery of non-economic damages to give “pecuniary 
satisfaction.”248  The court reasoned that Watt’s action for medical negligence 
and her claim for non-economic damages fell into the category of “civil ac-
tions for damages resulting from personal wrongs” that had been tried by 
Missouri juries since 1820.249   
The court also examined the scope of Watts’ right in regard to judicial 
remittitur.250  The court found that both English common law and Missouri 
common law allowed judges to grant plaintiffs new trials when the verdict 
was “inconsistent with the evidence.”251  “Although Missouri cases [in the 
early to mid 1800s] approved of judicial remittitur,” later cases ruled that 
remittitur was incorrect.252  Because of “inconsistent precedent” recognizing 
judicial remittitur as a valid exercise of judicial power, the court reasoned that 
such inconsistency “stem[med] from a long-standing reluctance in the com-
mon law to tamper with the jury’s constitutional role as the finder of fact.”253  
After looking at the history of English and Missouri common law, the court 
concluded that limits on damage awards “did not exist and were not contem-
plated” in 1820 as the phrase “heretofore enjoyed” referenced.254 
B.  Right to Trial by Jury to “Remain Inviolate” 
Watts also argued that the jury’s determination of damages did not “re-
main inviolate” when section 538.210 was applied.255  Watts argued that be-
cause the common law in 1820 never recognized legislative authority over 
juries, pieces of “legislative interference” such as section 538.210 should be 
declared unconstitutional.256  Watts also reasoned that the statute violated 
article II, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution, “the constitutional separation 
of powers[.]”257  Watts stated that the statutory limitation “invade[d] the tradi-
  
 247. Id. at 638.  
 248. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 116, 
122 (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., Garland Publ’g 1978) (1783). 
 249. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638. 
 250. Id. at 639. 
 251. Id. at 638. 
 252. Id. at 639.  Compare Carr & Co. v. Edwards, 1 Mo. 137, 137 (Mo. 1821) 
(stating “if the jury find greater damages than the plaintiff has counted for, and the 
Court render judgment according to such finding, it is error”), with Firestone v. 
Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (holding that 
judicial remittitur was not a valid exercise of judicial power). 
 253. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 639. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Initial Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 237, at *39-40. 
 256. Id. at *40, *47. 
 257. Id. at *10. 
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tional judicial function” of evaluating whether an award was extreme or in-
sufficient and instead permitted a “legislative remittitur” that superseded ju-
dicial power and took no account of facts on a case-by-case basis.258  
Cox argued that the “remain inviolate” language did not suggest that the 
right to trial by jury was associated with particular causes of actions or reme-
dies and did not limit the legislative power of the General Assembly.259  Ad-
ditionally, Cox argued that even if Watts was right, rejecting legislative 
power “would be pervasive and landscape-altering,” leaving the General As-
sembly powerless to change a cause of action or remedy for fear of a “‘hos-
tile’ impact” on the right to a jury trial.260 
Considering both arguments, the court looked at whether the right to a 
jury trial “remain[s] inviolate” after section 538.210 is applied to a damage 
award.261  The court held that “the right to trial by jury cannot ‘remain invio-
late’ when an injured party is deprived of the jury’s constitutionally assigned 
role of determining damages according to the particular facts of the case.”262  
The court stated that one of the longstanding, primary functions of the jury is 
to determine plaintiff damages.263  Because section 538.210 imposed a cap on 
the jury’s award independent from the facts of the case and limited the jury’s 
constitutional role of determining damages, the court decided that section 
538.210 “necessarily and unavoidably violate[d] the state constitutional right 
to trial by jury.”264  The court then looked to other states where limits on 
damages had been found to violate constitutional right to trial by jury.265  The 
court found that states such as Washington,266 Oregon, 267 Alabama,268 and 
  
 258. Id. 
 259. Initial Brief for Respondent-Appellee, supra note 241, at *21. 
 260. Id. at *30-31. 
 261. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
 262. Id. at 640. 
 263. Id. at 639-40 (“[T]he jury here assessed liability and determined damages, 
thus fulfilling its constitutional task.” (quoting Richardson v. State Highway & 
Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1993) (en banc))). 
 264. Id. at 640. 
 265. Id. at 640-41. 
 266. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 716 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (hold-
ing the Washington constitution protects the jury’s role to determine damages and 
when limitations are applied the right to a trial by jury inviolate is not preserved). 
 267. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 474 (Or. 1999) (holding a statu-
tory cap violates the right to trial by jury when it prevents the jury’s award from its 
full effect). 
 268. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 163 (Ala. 1991) (holding 
statutory damage caps violate the right to trial by jury because “the trial judge is re-
quired summarily to disregard the jury’s assessment of the amount of noneconomic 
loss, that species of damages lying most peculiarly within the jury’s discretion”). 
26
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Florida,269 whose constitutions also included the “remain inviolate” language, 
reached similar conclusions: the constitutional right to a jury trial is violated 
when caps on damages restrict the jury’s fact finding role.270  
C.  Overturning Erroneous Precedent in Adams 
In making its decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri also had to de-
termine how the holding in Watts would affect Adams v. Children’s Mercy 
Hospital.271  Watts asked the court to overrule Adams.272  Cox argued that 
under stare decisis, Missouri’s high court should follow precedent set forth in 
Adams since controlling law and constitutional principles remained the same 
since the case was handed down.273   
After revisiting Adams, Watts argued that the court should follow the 
reasoning in State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, which held that the decision 
committed a “fundamental error [] in concluding that statutory law [could] 
trump the constitutional right to jury trial.”274  The court found “four flaws in 
Adams rationale.”275  First, the court found Adams misunderstood the right to 
trial by jury as provided by the Missouri Constitution.276  Under Adams, even 
if the jury performed its constitutional duty and determined damages, a statu-
tory cap denied the plaintiff’s his or her full recovery.277  After section 
538.210 was applied, the court equated the jury’s role to a “meaningless op-
portunity to assess damages” that “‘pays lip service to the form of the jury but 
robs it of its function.’”278 
Second, the court reasoned Adams erroneously allowed a “legislative 
limitation” to be placed on “an individual constitutional right.”279  The court 
found Adams flawed because a statutory limit on the right to a jury trial is an 
“impermissible legislative alteration of the [c]onstitution.”280  Additionally, 
Adams never acknowledged any of the “myriad cases recognizing that a stat-
  
 269. Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a 
plaintiff limited on the amount of damages recovered violates Florida’s right to jury 
trial and the right of access to courts). 
 270. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 640-41. 
 271. Id. at 637. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Initial Brief for Respondent-Appellee, supra note 241, at *4-5, *11-14. 
 274. Initial Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 237, at *23 (quoting Klotz v. 
St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 774 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 275. Watts, 377 S.W.3d at 642. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. (quoting Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721 (Wash. 1989) (en 
banc)). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
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ute may not limit constitutional rights.”281  Instead, Adams cited De May v. 
Liberty Foundry Company.282  The Adams court reasoned from DeMay that 
“[i]f the legislature has the constitutional power to create and abolish causes 
of action, the legislature also has the power to limit recovery . . . . ”283  The 
Watts court concluded Adams’ reliance on De May was inappropriate as noth-
ing in the case suggested the legislature could deny a plaintiff seeking relief 
of his or her constitutional rights.284  If this were the case, the court argued, 
constitutional protections would only be theoretical privileges that could be 
withdrawn at any time.285 
Third, Adams cited an inapplicable 1987 Supreme Court of the United 
States decision, Tull v. United States.286  In Tull, the right to a jury trial did 
not extend to a determination of damages in a civil penalty case.287  Adams, 
however, dealt with common law damages, not civil penalties.288  
Lastly, the court found Adams was incorrect because the court reached 
its decision without citing any relevant Missouri law, because the court did 
not consider DeMay to be “applicable Missouri law.”289  “Instead, Adams 
relie[d] on a Virginia case, Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, and 
Tull.”290  The Watts court found Adams’ use of Etheridge erroneous because 
of analytical differences between the Missouri and Virginia Constitutions.291  
While the Virginia Constitution states “trial by jury is preferable to any other, 
and ought to be held sacred,”292 it does not contain the same “remain invio-
late” phrasing found in the Missouri Constitution that guarantees a right to 
jury trial.293 
After discussing these four reasons, the court held Adams’ rationale and 
the cases it relied on to be incorrect.294  Considering the court’s stare decisis 
  
 281. Id. (“[A] statute may not infringe on a constitutional right; if the two are in 
conflict, then it is the statute rather than the constitution that must give way” (citing 
Mo. Alliance for Ret. Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 
682 (Mo. 2009) (en banc))). 
 282. Id. at 642-43. 
 283. Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. 1992) (en 
banc), overruled by Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633. 
 284. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 643. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 901.  Additionally, Tull was found to be irrelevant in a 
right to jury trial analysis in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 
340 (1998).  Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 643. 
 289. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 644. 
 290. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 291. Id. 
 292. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 293. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a). 
 294. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 644.  
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considerations, the court looked to previous cases where precedent was over-
turned to protect constitutional rights.295  The court concluded that Adams 
was unconstitutional and reversed the judgment that reduced the non-
economic damages with regard to section 538.210.296   
D.  The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Mary R. Russell, joined by Judges Breckenridge and Price, dis-
sented, choosing to uphold the statutory cap.297  Judge Russell felt that al-
though the Watts family experienced a tragic and unfortunate situation, the 
court had no duty to determine whether section 538.210 was “good policy,” 
but must only determine whether the legislative provision violated the Mis-
souri Constitution.298  The dissent argued Adams was longstanding, control-
ling precedent for over twenty years and should not be overturned.299  Judge 
Russell agreed with the court’s analysis in Adams, that section 538.210 did 
not obstruct the jury’s fact-finding or assessment of damages as it was applied 
after the jury had “served its constitutional task,” and thus did not violate the 
Missouri Constitution.300   
The dissent also discussed other states that agreed with the court’s rea-
soning in Adams, including states with the same “inviolate” language in their 
state constitutions as Missouri: Nebraska, Idaho, Ohio, and Maryland.301  She 
also disagreed with the majority who criticized Etheridge and distinguished 
the Virginia and Missouri Constitutions.302  Judge Russell argued that al-
though the two state constitutions contained “superficial” language differ-
ences, both guaranteed a right to jury trial “that existed at common law.”303  
The dissent also pointed to cases that supported Adam’s reasoning in jurisdic-
tions with and without the “inviolate” language.304 
V.  COMMENT 
This Part will explore the criticisms of a cap on non-economic damages 
in Missouri.  First, this Part will discuss how the court chose to apply the 
constitutional language and the importance of judges in interpreting constitu-
  
 295. Id. (“[W]hile . . . hesitant to overturn precedent, [the court] nonetheless has 
followed its obligation to do so where necessary to protect the constitutional rights of 
Missouri’s citizens.”). 
 296. Id. at 646. 
 297. Id. at 648-52 (Russell, J., dissenting). 
 298. Id. at 648. 
 299. Id. at 649-50. 
 300. Id. at 649. 
 301. Id. at 650-51; see supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text. 
 302. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 651. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 651-53. 
29
Lawrence: Lawrence: Constitutionality of Caps
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: LawrencePaginated.docx Created on:  10/31/13 7:46 PM Last Printed: 2/1/14 12:05 PM 
630 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
tional rights.  Second, this Part will address the many problems with non-
economic caps including inconclusive evidence about the effects of caps on 
insurance premiums and why caps do not improve the availability or quality 
of physician care.  
A.  The Importance of Judges’ Constitutional Interpretation  
Whether placing a cap on the amount of non-economic damages a plain-
tiff can recover violates his or her right to a jury trial is a controversial issue 
that has been addressed by several states.  A number of these states have the 
exact same wording in their respective state constitutions, yet different out-
comes have been reached.  States are split on this issue because in the end, 
many judgments depend on how judges interpreted the constitutional lan-
guage and how they view the jury’s role.305  In Missouri, the majority of the 
supreme court interpreted the “remain inviolate” language to mean that a jury 
must determine damage amounts to complete their “constitutional task” as 
was done in 1820.306  Other judges, including the three dissenters in Watts, 
have interpreted these terms differently: they reason if the cap is applied after 
the jury has determined damages, the “constitutional task” of providing a jury 
trial has already been fulfilled.307  They claimed any statutory changes made 
to the damage award later are a matter of law, not fact, and do not harm the 
right to trial by jury.308 
Whether an individual believes a jury has performed its constitutional 
duty before or after a damage award is handed down to the plaintiff, the result 
can have serious consequences.  This small, yet crucial difference in reason-
ing emphasizes the importance of judges in our legal system and the power 
they have in interpreting constitutional rights.  The judiciary’s ability to inter-
pret meaning behind words has become widely accepted as a “permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”309  There are two main 
views about how to interpret constitutional wording: one side argues a consti-
tution should be read the way it was originally understood when it was first 
drafted.310  Other judges take the “living document” approach, or the view 
that a constitution should “grow and evolve over time[.]”311 
No matter what approach a judge chooses, life-changing judgments can 
come down to who sits on the bench and what he or she personally believes.  
  
 305. See supra Part III.E. 
 306. See Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638-40. 
 307. Id. at 649-50. 
 308. See id. at 649. 
 309. PAMELA S. KARLAN, GOODWIN LIU & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 23 (2009), 
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/ACS_KeepFaith_FNL.pdf (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 310. Id. at 24-25. 
 311. Id. at 25. 
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Ideally, judges practice judicial independence and do not rely on outside in-
fluences; they look only to the source of the language, here the respective 
state constitution.  However, this is not always the case.  Missouri has a his-
tory of cases where judges allowed statutory law to override constitutional 
rights.312  Rather than interpret the laws of their jurisdiction, judges have de-
ferred to the legislature’s decision on public policy, allowing constitutional 
rights to be altered and, at times, altogether done away with.313  Even though 
these “flawed” case decisions have since been overturned, this reasoning may 
still be prevalent in some courts across the United States today.  Judges are 
subjected to many influences throughout their daily lives that realistically 
cannot be avoided.314  However, judicial independence is compromised when 
these outside influences result in judges losing their ability to adjudicate for 
the parties.315  
Regardless of whether or not an individual believes the “inviolate” lan-
guage was correctly interpreted, it is still important to know who is sitting on 
our courts, how they choose to interpret constitutional language and where 
they stand when it comes to protecting the constitutional rights of Missouri 
citizens. 
B.  The Impact of Caps on the Health Care System 
Aside from constitutional interpretation, it is important to look at the 
policy issues non-economic damages caps present.  Morally, caps can be a 
problem as the system benefits the negligent and harms the most seriously 
injured.316  Many question this “fix” for the health care system that “effec-
tively force[s] the most seriously injured patients to take on a disproportion-
ate share of the costs of medical errors.”317  Even if non-economic caps mar-
ginally reduced costs for physician insurance premiums, it is unacceptable to 
  
 312. See Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906-07 (Mo. 1992) 
(finding statutory limits on noneconomic damages constitutional despite the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial), overruled by Watts, 376 S.W.3d 633; see also State ex rel. 
Tolbert v. Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d 929, 932-33 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992) (denying a right 
to jury trial in MHRA cases), overruled by State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 
82 (Mo. 2003); see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d at 933. 
 314. Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 12 (Peter H. Russell & David 
M. O’Brien eds., 2001). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Harris, supra note 5, at 178-79 (“Current tort reform limits on provider liabil-
ity are unfair because they, in effect, transfer losses from the deserving to the unde-
serving.”). 
 317. Williams, supra note 14, at 495 (quoting Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing 
and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
667, 694 (2006)). 
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place the burden on patients who have been hurt.  When a cap is in place, it 
sends a message to Missouri citizens that they do not deserve compensation 
to the full extent of their injuries and that victims must bear the burden to 
help preserve the health care system. 
When caps are not in place, doctors are more likely to take extra precau-
tions to deter error, rather than face high malpractice liability.318  A medical 
error is “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended . . . or the 
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim[.]”319  Studies have shown that as many 
as 98,000 deaths a year are caused from medical negligence or mistake.320  
This number is astounding, especially when considering 98,000 is two times 
as many as the number of Americans who die in automobile accidents each 
year.321  
While “[t]he potential of an unlimited or ‘uncapped’ . . . award deters 
misconduct from health care providers,” a damage cap does little to police 
misconduct or remove inadequate doctors from practice.322  Unlike other 
forms of insurance, doctors’ malpractice insurance premiums are not based 
on past performance or payout.323  Because insurance companies do not take 
a doctor’s skill into account and do not raise premiums for high payouts,324 
there may be less impact on a doctor’s safety precaution when damages re-
main capped.  Additionally, state disciplinary boards do little to discipline 
doctors for misconduct.325  According to one study, of the more than 35,000 
doctors who received a medical payout between 1990 and 2002, only 7.6% 
were disciplined by their state board.326  The same study showed state boards 
only disciplined 13.3% of doctors with five or more medical malpractice pay-
outs.327  
  
 318. See Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right 
to Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 233, 246 (2010) (“Medical liability leads medical providers to make expensive 
and durable investments in safety that benefit all of their patients.”). 
 319. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 28 
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 320. Id. at 1. 
 321. Id. at 1, 26. 
 322. Harris, supra note 5, at 177-78 (“Medical malpractice lawsuits with unlim-
ited recovery are a way of policing misconduct and weeding out bad doctors, which 
neither insurance companies nor physician organizations track satisfactorily.”). 
 323. Carrie Lynn Vine, Comment, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Crisis: Alternatives to Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413, 427-28 (2006) (“[I]n 
most cases prior claim or payout history does not affect premium rates[.]”). 
 324. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 410 (noting that physicians are not experience-rated 
and both “negligent and nonnegligent physicians pay similar premiums”). 
 325. Harris, supra note 5, at 178. 
 326. JACKSON WILLIAMS, PUB. CITIZEN CONG. WATCH, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS: 
CHALLENGING THE MALPRACTICE CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS’ LOBBY 21 (2003), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/BRIEFING%20BOOK--MISDIAGNOSIS.pdf. 
 327. Id. 
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There is also conflicting evidence on whether caps affect medical mal-
practice insurance premiums, as both sides of the cap debate strongly disputes 
the other’s findings.328  With a cap in place, insurance companies pay out less 
in claims each year; in theory this should result in lower premiums for doc-
tors who are required to have medical malpractice insurance and for consum-
ers who buy health insurance.329  Yet data shows an inconsistent correlation 
between damage caps and lowered premiums.330 
The United States has recently seen a trend in lowered malpractice pre-
mium rates across most states, leading experts to believe that caps cannot be 
the only reason for the decreased rates.331  Medical malpractice insurance 
rates vary state by state,332 but also vary widely within states.333  “In Detroit, 
Michigan, a medical malpractice . . . carrier quotes $34,922 for a general 
internist, but . . . on the other side of the state, in Kalamazoo, [the same cov-
erage] would be $14,143, or 60% less.”334  This suggests that even within a 
state with the same non-economic cap, malpractice premiums can widely 
vary based on city or region.  Although differing laws play some role in why 
premiums vary by state, other factors such as judges, plaintiffs’ lawyers, the 
willingness to bring a claim, and the rate at which juries award damages also 
affect premium rates.335  
Proponents of non-economic damage limits also argue that caps prevent 
high numbers of frivolous claims from reaching a court.336  The problem with 
preventing litigation through caps is that it also discourages claims with merit 
  
 328. Harris, supra note 5, at 180-81. 
 329. See AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, FIVE MYTHS ABOUT MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 9 
(2003), http://www.justice.org/clips/five_myths_about_medical_negligence.pdf. 
 330. Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage 
Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Qual-
ity and Safety in Healthcare, 30 AM J.L. & MED. 501, 505-06 (2004) (“[I]n 1975 
California had the highest premiums in the nation” but as a result of the Medical In-
jury Compensation Reform Act, physicians in California pay premiums in the lowest 
one-third); Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient Compen-
sation Crisis?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 681 (2010) (“Contrary to the assertions of 
tort reform proponents, closed claims data suggest little connection between the liabil-
ity system and premium fluctuations.”). 
 331. Robert Lowes, Rising Malpractice Insurance Premiums? Yes and No, 
MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.medscape.com 
/viewarticle/751009. 
 332. Id. (“[I]n 2010, the highest quote for a $1 million/$3 million policy for a 
general internist is . . . in Miami-Dade County, Florida, where First Professionals 
Insurance charges $47,431 . . . . The lowest quote is $3,375 throughout Minne-
sota[.]”). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. See AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 329, at 2. 
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from being filed and reaching a court.337  Data suggests that most patients 
who experience negligent care do not file malpractice claims.338  One study 
found that only about one in eight patients who experience negligent injuries 
file a claim.339  “[T]he problem is not too many claims,” but not enough 
claims.340  
Further, a cap’s overall impact on the health care system is minimal be-
cause malpractice costs are such a small part of total heath care spending.341  
A study by the Congressional Budget Office in 2004 found that “even a re-
duction of 25 percent to 30 percent in malpractice costs would lower health 
care costs by only about 0.4 percent to 0.5 percent, and the likely effect on 
health insurance premiums would be comparably small.”342  Medical mal-
practice litigation costs in the United States each year amount to only two 
percent of total health care spending.343 
Supporters of caps also argue that limits on non-economic damages keep 
doctors practicing within the state.344  However, there is little evidence that 
shows correlation between the implementation of caps and where or how 
  
 337. MICHELLE M. MELLO, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND 
EFFECT OF STATE TORT REFORMS 15, http://www.rwjf.org 
/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf11941/subassets/rwjf11941_1 
(instead of discouraging frivolous litigation, damage caps “burden the most severely 
injured patients”). 
 338. Williams, supra note 14, at 485. 
 339. HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31692, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
LIABILITY REFORM: LEGAL ISSUES AND FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CAPS ON PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AND NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 1 (2005), http://www.law.umaryland.edu 
/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL3169202082005.pdf.  The study was contin-
ued by Harvard School of Public Health researchers, who additionally examined over 
1,400 closed medical negligence claims and found that ninety-seven percent of claims 
were meritorious and eighty percent involved death or serious injury.  Studdert et al., 
supra note 4, at 2025-26.  
 340. COHEN, supra note 339, at 1. 
 341. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: LIMITING 
TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2004), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-
medicalmalpractice.pdf. 
 342. Id. at 6. 
 343. Id. 
 344. FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., THE IMPACT OF STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON 
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS 2 (2003), http://www.ahrq.gov 
/research/tortcaps/tortcaps.pdf (arguing that “[s]upporters of legislation to cap dam-
ages in malpractice cases maintain that it reduces malpractice premiums and helps 
insure an adequate supply of physicians”). 
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doctors choose to practice.345  Many physicians claim frivolous malpractice 
suits pressured them in their practice to order unnecessary tests or defer pa-
tients out of fear of being sued.346  However, physician surveys reveal these 
concerns are unrelated to a doctor’s respective state malpractice protection, 
including caps on non-economic damages.347  What is more alarming is that 
“physicians do not consider medical errors a ‘problem’” when compared to 
other health care issues such as frivolous claims and malpractice insurance 
rates.348  Until physicians start recognizing the real problems within the health 
care system – the egregious amount of negligent medical errors – the health 
care system will remain in crisis.  
Generally, the use of non-economic damage caps have not consistently 
reduced rates for insurance premiums, have not deterred doctors from acting 
negligently, and have not reassured physicians in their practice.  Additionally, 
caps present a moral issue, asking the worst injured patients to subsidize doc-
tors for their negligent errors.  States need to look to alternative solutions to 
fix the health care system to ensure their citizens’ recovery rights instead of 
relying on caps to “fix” a broken system. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
After the Watts decision, there are currently no caps on non-economic 
damages in Missouri.349  Because some feel the ruling in Watts will lead to a 
rise in the number of lawsuits and an increase in medical malpractice premi-
ums, some individuals are calling for the General Assembly to restore the 
non-economic damages cap as a “high priority” issue in 2013.350  In January 
2013, two bills were introduced to recreate a statutory cause of action against 
health care providers in malpractices cases.351  The legislature is also consid-
  
 345. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO-03-836, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 16-
24 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf. 
 346. Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians’ Fears of Malpractice Are Not Assuaged 
by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585, 1587 (2010), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/9/1585.full.pdf+html. 
 347. Id. at 1590. 
 348. Williams, supra note 14, at 487 (“[O]ne-third of surveyed physicians named 
medical malpractice lawsuits and medical malpractice insurance as the two biggest 
problems in healthcare, but only [five percent] listed medical errors resulting in pa-
tient injuries as the biggest problem in healthcare.”); see also Robert J. Blendon et al., 
Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1933, 1935 (2002), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056 
/NEJMsa022151. 
 349. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 350. Gallegos, supra note 16. 
 351. Representative Eric Burlison introduced House Bill 112.  See H.B. 112, 97th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), available at http://www.house.mo.gov 
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ering a constitutional amendment to limit lawsuits against medical profes-
sionals.352  However, Missouri voters would need to approve such an 
amendment.353  If Missouri overturns the Watts decision and reinstates a cap 
system, many changes should be made to the non-economic cap policy that 
was in place from 2005 to 2012, including a cap that is adjusted for inflation.  
However, because of Missouri’s strong constitutional “remain inviolate” lan-
guage, Missouri will likely have to explore other options besides caps in the 
future when making decisions about tort reform litigation. 
In July of 2012, the Supreme Court of Missouri had an important deci-
sion to make: uphold a twenty-six-year-old capped damages policy or rein-
state the right to trial by jury as guaranteed under the Missouri Constitu-
tion.354  After analyzing specific language in the constitution and analyzing 
the jury’s role, the court made the correct decision in Watts, and ruled for 
individual constitutional rights over legislative measures.355  Although policy 
opinions about non-economic caps remain on both sides of the issue, the 
court’s decision should be celebrated and recognized as a success for consti-
tutional rights advocates.  While many problems with the health care system 
still remain, instead of looking to ways to reinstate the cap or create a consti-
tutional amendment that will threaten Missouri’s right to jury trial, the Gen-
eral Assembly should explore alternative options to ensure the health care 
system remains available and affordable in the future.   
 
  
/billsummary.aspx?bill=HB112&year=2013&code=R.  Senator Dan Brown intro-
duced Senate Bill 105.  See S.B. 105, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), 
available at http://www.senate.mo.gov /13info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType 
=R&BillID=17100416. 
 352. Senator Brad Lager introduced Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 to repeal Mis-
souri’s right to jury trial and adopt a new section relating to non-economic damage 
awards.  See S.J.R. 1, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), available at 
http://legiscan.com/MO/text/SJR1/id/671326.  
 353. Chris Blank, Missouri Lawmakers to Pursue Medical Liability Limits, KAN. 
CITY STAR, Jan. 5, 2013, http://www.kansascity.com/2013/01/05/3995913/missouri-
lawmakers-to-pursue-medical.html. 
 354. See Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 635-36. 
 355. Id. at 637-46. 
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